Replacing linear for logarithmic/curve ratio for Maha/MahaX

[enamakel]

@LongWay

A general question is whether it is necessary for MahaX to decrease over time when holding MahaX. Or can we leave this out completely?

So once you stake, your MAHAX value is locked and wont decrease unless you unstake. This is how the functionality currently works in Curve Finance.

The reason for having a decreasing voting power, is simply because of the fact that in order to create a proper democratic system, it is important to have some mechanism of passing down power so that the first advantage effect is sort of diminished.

We should try to envision holding MAHAX as literally holding a % of power in a democracy rather than as an investment (For which there is staking; once you stake your MAHAX staked does not decrease).

In this scenario, it’d be more beneficial to reduce voting power the larger the MAHAX holding a person has because that implies greater power. However for now in this iteration, I think it’ll be beneficial to just keep the discussion ways to encourage people to lock for longer.

Bringing about a curve as mentioned in this proposal was a suggestion that one of our economists have brought about given the fact that how curves (such as Bonding curves) are a useful way to incentivize people to lock for longer.

[Michael]

@enamakel

So once you stake, your MAHAX value is locked and wont decrease unless you unstake.

@LongWay Ahh, my mistake - I had thought the decay also applies to staking as well. Governance power decays, but staking rewards use a fixed mahax value without decay.

@enamakel There is several examples above of different approaches to creating a curve here Do you have any feedback on these and what might be a better approach?

Given the average lock time currently is around 1.5 years, and with my new understanding of a locked mahax value for staking, but a decay for governance power, I think the S-Curve approach in fig.2 might be interesting and suitable.

Here we encourage a slightly higher lock time, while diminishing the decay strength for voting.

[Marian]

@enamakel

So once you stake, your MAHAX value is locked and wont decrease unless you unstake. This is how the functionality currently works in Curve Finance

So technically you already fix this problem at the origins?
The share of the pool won’t decay? (Only the parth who recive fees)

[ultra219]

this is pretty good , it will prevent confusion

[luciamucia]

@Marian

If is possible something like that can be the ideal situation
Something like…an “nft” is created when you lock your maha, after that mahaX (and the voting power) continues to decrease but this “nft” represents the original value locked (10k $ in this case) so the fees will be paid to that nft
When lock expires you have to give back that nft to withdraw your maha
…I am not shure if what I write have sense ,

Example
Whe you lock 1000 maha for 4 years you recive

1. 1000 mahaX
2. 1 nft who says “this adress have 1000 mahaX”

It would be similar to SSGTx governance tolen from YFDAI project.
That 5000 each staked SSGTx tokens gives 1 NTF voting token.
at the same time you are blle to earn 72% APY on staked SSGTx.

[luciamucia]

@LongWay

As an example without decrease over time:

You lock 500 Maha in the following locks on 1. November 2021:

200 Maha for 4 years = 200 MahaX until 1. November 2025.
200 Maha for 2 years = 100 MahaX until 1. November 2023
100 Maha for 1 year = 25 MahaX until 1. November 2022

The number of MahaX you hold would then be as follows:

Total 325 MahaX from 1. November 2021 to 1. November 2022. (Assuming you do not lock more.).

Total 300 MahaX from 2. November 2022 to 1. November 2023 (Assuming you do not lock more in the meantime and let the 1-year lock expire).

Total 200 MahaX from 2. November 2023 to 1. November 2025 (Assuming you do not lock more in the meantime and let the 2-year lock expire).

This would offer more flexible lock options and easier integration of the total MahaX into applications such as Staking or MahaStarter etc.

Definitely I prefer the idea of @LongWay. It was my assumption before introduction MahaX that I will be able to create “staking ladder” lock my Maha for different periods and have advantages of flexibility and voting power at the same time.

Moreover I don’t like what we have right now that I’m loosing my voting power over time because.
e.g. you started with 300 MAHA for 4 years. You have to constantly add some MAHA to keep 300 MahaX. Which is insane. I would prefer to have a change to create new licking period e.g. after 2 years for 2 years

[LongWay]

@Michael

Next - ‘fig.2’ with S-curve’

If the MahaX reduce over time in the same way as you receive them at the beginning, this looks like the following for an S-curve. This gives a better impression of how the MahaX decrease in power over a period of 4 years (here as an example).

[Marian]

Steven already fix this problem at the origins, practically only the voting power of mahaX decay, the “financial” part remains the same until stacking period ends

[Michael]

@LongWay

This gives a better impression of how the MahaX decrease in power over a period of 4 years (here as an example).

The original graph was representing the MahaX you get upon locking - not the decay overtime. But yes, the decay would be the inverse of it.

[enamakel]

While this is a great idea to discuss, the main issue here is implementation. The current code uses complex logic using slopes to understand where in curve we are in for MAHAX representation.

If we replace this with a log function, then the entire logic will have to be rewritten. Besides that point, the counting mechanism cannot be changed once it has been deployed (once of the facets of being part of the blockchain).

So unfortunately, we will have to shelve this idea for now.